The Price of Fish

The Price of Fish presents a one-sided view on the QMS, supported by interviews of well-known opponents of QMS-type systems. Accordingly, it gets a low rating for balanced journalism.

Its main message is that all problems stem from the QMS and so it needs to be dismantled and replaced once a comprehensive review has occurred regarding what is right for us collectively. This message is misleading because it fails to clarify that any type of fisheries management system must grapple with the same problems, which include legal and illegal discards, high grading, environmental impacts of fishing, along with setting sustainable catch limits, enforcing those limits, allocating access between fishing sectors and within them, and being able to pay for all of these services.

Winston Churchill’s statement comes to mind, ‘democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.’ This same sentiment applies to QMS-type systems; they are not perfect, but in almost all situations they are far better than the alternative, such as the open access system that pre-dated NZ’s QMS, which was rife with illegal, cash-based sales of inshore catches.

In most situations, QMS-type systems are also preferable to effort-based systems. This is why QMS-type systems have been adopted by at least 21 other fishing nations, and around 25% of catches worldwide are now taken under these systems. We need to ensure they are continually improved because they aren’t going away, especially in NZ where the QMS is entrenched in law with 30+ years of practice, along with the Treaty settlement.

In saying that, there were plenty of mistakes made. The omission of part-time fishers from the criteria for quota allocations, for the purpose of administrative ease, stands out as a significant social and economic blight on the history of managing fisheries. Some would argue that another mistake was so many fishers prepared to sell their quota, and the only willing buyers were a few companies. This history, and that of other fishing nations, is easy to criticise in hindsight. The mistakes are much harder to fix unless there is a political will and dedicated departmental resources.

It is, therefore, almost inconceivable that The Price of Fish argues that NZ’s QMS is so fundamentally flawed that it must be dismantled and replaced. But with what? The Faroe Island’s example is of an effort-based system that suits its primary fishery, mixed demersal, that is not without its share of problems. It is also an example of a nation of 50,000 who are the indigenous people and highly reliant on fisheries as their main economic base. It is far easier for them to focus on the importance of fisheries and devise principles that should be viewed as their point of difference with (independence from) Denmark and in relation to other Scandinavian nations and the EU.  

The Price of Fish might have been more convincing if it included some evidence of there being a political will, backed up by several Iwi, to consider dismantling the QMS at a cost of billions, which would essentially re-litigate the Treaty settlement. Iwi were interested in the QMS because of the quota ownership rights in perpetuity. They will not re-litigate these rights and replace them with resource rentals.

Resource rentals were highly contentious during the settlement process due to the Crown asserting its ownership of the fish. If ownership clarification was pursued in the courts, we might be surprised at the influence that article 2 of the Treaty might have in that decision. While ‘the fish belong to the people’ is a catchy phrase, it is imbued with more emotion than fact.

But, management systems of all sorts must continue to evolve as social values and expectations change (e.g. maintain ecosystem functions, increase fisheries abundance, etc). However, it is best to beware of any starting position that advocates wholesale dismantling of the QMS based on a one-sided view, which raises questions about motives.  

One thing we know is that there is an inherent imbalance in management priorities between commercial and recreational fishing. Without a unified voice, recreational fishers risk management decisions furthering that imbalance.